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Unilateral Executive Power ENSHRINED in
Law: The Zivotofsky Court Stays the Course
KIMBERLEY L. FLETCHER*
Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) is the most recent challenge to presidential
prerogatives, and while the Supreme Court addresses the erroneous mistake
espoused by Justice Sutherland in 1936, the Court ultimately fails to harness
the unbridled powers of the Executive in the area of foreign affairs. The
Court establishes a new standard for presidential ascendancy, which leaves
the imperial president largely intact. This Article shows that a dynamic and
fluid institutional relationship exists between the executive branch and the
Court; the Court affects constitutional and political development by taking a
leading role in interpreting presidential decision-making in the area of foreign affairs since 1936. Examining key cases and controversies in foreign
policymaking, this Article exposes patterns of regime building by the Court,
highlights feedback loops, and examines the long-term effect on presidential
politics. Presidents are not bound by their position in the regime. In the area
of foreign affairs, presidents, because of the dynamic nature of the Court, are
unconstrained by the institutional context of their leadership efforts based on
their predecessors.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States instituted a new constitutional1
order when it decided United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation2
A5Curtiss-Wright-@ in 1032. The Curtiss-Wright Court established a new role
for the Executive vis-à-vis the legislative branch. Prior to 1936, the Court
settled cases in favor of a strong legislature to formulate our nation’s foreign
policy, which undermined a President’s claim to executive unilateralism.
This switch placed the Court as the vanguard of redefining the scope and path
of international relations.
Scholars that track doctrinal development in the area of foreign affairs
simply note that a shift occurred and illustrate how this reallocation of power
has resulted in executives claiming broad unilateral powers with little oversight.3 However, the doctrinal shift of 1936 is best explained as the intersection of legal and political time4 and evaluated over developmental time. A
brief overview of some of the most significant cases the Court has decided
since Curtiss-Wright showcases the influential role of the Court on the institutional dynamics of the Executive and demonstrates that the Court has empowered, and legally sanctioned, unilateral presidential action in foreign policymaking. Zivotofsky5 falls within this narrative.
The Court is not autonomous from the political system and is consequently positioned at the juncture of law and politics.6 Political and legal time
operate differently, but the juncture of these two concepts can constrain the
courts and simultaneously provide the space for the courts to make decisions
that reconfigure the political and constitutional developmental paths of the
executive and legislative branches. Ultimately, even if a decision by the
Court does not appear to clearly make a new law, the decision rendered can
still be noteworthy if it signals a ma4or change in the Court’s 4urisprudence.

1. See Kimberley L. Fletcher, The Court’s =ecisive Hand %hapes the Executive’s
Foreign Affairs Policymaking Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 247 (2013).
2. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
3. See Louis Fisher, The Law( Presidential Inherent Power( The “%ole 'rgan” =oc8
trine, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 130> 142 A2007@ Aclarifying Marshall’s 5sole organ- speech@$
see also David G. Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 39 (David G. Adler & Larry N. George eds.,
1996) A5FThe Court’sE invocation of the political-question doctrine has been a major means by
which the judiciary has strengthened the role of the president in the conduct of foreign policy.-@.
4. See Fletcher, supra note 1; see also RONALD KAHN & KEN I. KERSCH, THE
SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 4-7 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch
eds., 2006).
5. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
6. See KAHN & KERSCH, supra note 4, at 16.
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Political time, as Skowronek notes> is the 5various relationships incum<
bents project between previously established commitments of ideology and
interest>- and the Executive’s response> in this analysis> to the perceived
emergency.7 Skowronek adds that the executive branch experiences institutional thickening—an institution having 5shorter time periods for successful
innovation.-8 Legal time is quite different from the political time of the presidency, and it is this disparity that has important implications on the developmental narratives of both the judicial and executive branches. Legal time
is defined by how the 5.upreme Court interacts with the world outside the
Court>-9 including external factors or constraints occurring in political time.
The 4udicial branch is therefore 5positioned at the 4uncture of law and poli<
tics>- and the uni'ue 'uality of the Court is 5inherent in the nature of judicial
power.-10 So, while institutional barriers might constrain the executive
branch, they do not bind the Court.11 As such, the path of the Court and the
President is not a fixed pathway12 in foreign affairs.13
When the Court decides a case involving international relations and foreign policy making, the Court makes constitutional choices that, at times,
may confront the primary commitments of the majority coalition and the major political institutions, in this case, the executive branch. On the other hand,
the Court may select decisive moments in which to collaborate with an institution and make legal the construction and stabilization of an asserted political order. These constitutional choices reveal a continuous and constitutive
dynamic relationship between both the Court and the Executive. And in the
area of international relations, the Court has shaped and reconfigured the developmental narrative of unilateral discretionary powers since 1936.
The Court, as a decision-maker, is intertwined with the political system.
International relations are no exception to this general paradigm. Justice
George .utherland’s ma4ority opinion in Curtiss-Wright (1936) was a sharp
departure for the Court. The Court asserted that while the Constitution does
not explicitly vest in the Executive the authority to conduct foreign policy, it

7. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 30 (6th prtg. 2003).
8. Ronald Kahn, The Constitution May Be Undemocratic, but Not Supreme Court
Decision-Making: The Difference Between Legal and Political Time, DIG. COMMONS 2 (2006),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=schmooze_papers.
9. Id. at 3.
10. KAHN & KERSCH, supra note 4, at 16.
11. See KAHN & KERSCH, supra note 4.
12. Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251-67 (2000).
13. See Fletcher, supra note 1.
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is given implicitly through the commander-in-chief clause, thereby empowering the President the sole authority to conduct foreign affairs in a way that
Congress cannot and should not.14
The following sections include a historical overview of some notable
cases and controversies between Presidents and the Court over developmental time. This summary illustrates that this change in path trajectory provides
the executive branch with the legal positioning to make broad claims of unilateral decision-making. As such, we have borne witness to some outlandish
claims by executives, which have repeatedly found favor from the judicial
branch. This rapid growth in power since 1936 not only exemplifies the superior positioning of the Executive over the legislative branch in the area of
foreign affairs, but also calls into question how we understand the evolution
of the imperial president.15

II.

FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER—EARLY JUDICIAL RULINGS

The early judicial record shows the Supreme Court, in the area of international relations, favored a strong legislative branch while limiting the role
of the Executive. For example, when assessing which branch had the constitutional authority to declare war, the Court asserted it was the sole responsibility of the legislature to wage a 5partial- or 5limited- war.16 And only when
Congress authorizes war was the Executive called in to serve as commanderin-chief.17 And, when the President serves as commander-in-chief, he does
not have the freedom to choose the time, location, or scope of military activities.18 !s Louis Fisher summariBed> 5FpEresidential orders> even those issued
as Commander in Chief in time of war, are subject to restrictions imposed by
Congress.-19 Little v. Barreme (1804)20 is an early decision by the Court confirming this allocation of powers. At no point did the Court announce that the
14. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 302, 319-20 (1936).
15. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1973
(Houghton Mifflin Co. ed., Mariner Books 2004).
16. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800).
17. See Louis Fisher, Domestic Commander in Chief: Early Checks by Other
Branches, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 961, 968 (2008) [hereinafter Fisher, Domestic Commander in
Chief] Adiscussing Congress’s power to declare war and the President’s power to direct war@.
18. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 9-16 (1801) (discussing various acts by Congress
that designated military details for the war against France).
19. See Fisher, Domestic Commander in Chief, supra note 17, at 997.
20. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804). For a summary of the issue in Barreme, see
Fisher, Domestic Commander in Chief, supra note 17, at 007 A5Part of the legislation passed
by Congress in the 179861800 period, to authorize war against France, authorized the President to seize vessels sailing to French ports. President Adams exceeded the statute by issuing
a proclamation that directed American ships to capture vessels sailing to or from French
ports.-) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
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Executive has inherent powers allowing him the authority to ignore or to extend beyond a law passed by Congress.21 The one caveat the Executive had
in this area was that in the event the United States was invaded, it would be
lawful for the President to oppose such an invasion.22 As the Circuit Court
for the District of New York noted in its 1806 decision in United States v.
Smith:23 5Hoes Fthe PresidentE possess the power of making war" That power
is exclusively vested in congress . . . .-24 And Justice William Paterson of the
U.S. Supreme Court reasoned,
[P]lain reason, that a state of complete and absolute
war actually exists between the two nations. In the
case of invasive hostilities, there cannot be war on
the one side and peace on the other . . . There is a
manifest distinction between our going to war with
a nation at peace, and a war being made against us
by an actual invasion, or a formal declaration.25
Thus, if the United States was invaded, the President had only the constitutional authority and obligation to resist with force> but 5it is the exclusive
province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of war.-26 However, the Executive’s authority of self-defense (repelling sudden invasions)
did not extend beyond the water’s edge to foreign lands.
Later that century, the Court heard The Prize Cases, which called into
question a President’s exercise of military power without first procuring congressional approval.27 Following the attacks on Fort Sumter in April 1861,
and with the legislative branch in recess, President Abraham Lincoln issued

21. See Barreme> 2 ,... at 177 Anoting that President !dams’s orders clearly went
beyond the congressional statute).
22. See Act of May 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 264-23 A5!n !ct to provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.-@$ see
also Fisher, Domestic Commander in Chief, supra note 17, at 072 A5!s enacted> the militia
bill provided that whenever the ,nited .tates shall be invaded> or be ‘in imminent danger of
invasion’ . . . the president was authorized to call forth such number of the militia as he may
4udge necessary to repel the invasion.-) (internal citation omitted)); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
para. 11.
23. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
24. Id. at 1230.
25. Id. Justice William Paterson was also a delegate from New Jersey to the Constitutional Convention.
26. Id.
27. See The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635 (1862) (holding that the President did
not have the authority to order blockade and impound ships, even without formal declaration
of war) Acommonly identified as 5The PriBe Cases.-@.
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a set of proclamations calling forth the state militia.28 In addition, Lincoln
suspended the writ of habeas corpus and placed a blockade on southern ports
(resulting in the capture of several prizes and their cargoes) and rebellious
states.29 President Lincoln, acutely aware that his actions were illegal, requested statutory authorization from the legislature.30 While Congress ratified Lincoln’s actions>31 this situation marked the first time the Court heard
a case concerning the power of the Executive to respond to sudden attacks.32
In The Prize Cases Aknown formally as 5The Brig !my Warwick- case>
consisting of a set of cases> 5were . . . captured and brought in as prizes by
public ships of the ,nited .tates-@,33 the Court reasoned the President could
not initiate war, as that authority was reserved for Congress, and Congress
alone.34 Lincoln found the secession of several states and the prospect of open
hostilities to be sufficient justification to impose a blockade on the southern
ports.35 While the President is constitutionally bound to repel a sudden invasion by a foreign nation,36 it was a reach to extend this reasoning to the Confederacy. However, Lincoln went around this point, by declaring the Confederacy as belligerents. The commander-in-chief clause gave the President the
authority to proclaim a blockade as a method of waging war.37 Justice Robert
C. Grier, majority opinion writer in The Prize Cases, however, placed limits
on the Executive’s power to act defensively: 5He has no power to initiate or
declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic .tate.-38
These early decisions illustrate the Court’s continued adherence to establish a partnership between the legislative and executive branches. Assigning the legislature the sole duty of initiating hostilities, whether in the form
28. Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive
Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 56-57 (Christopher
H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
29. Id. at 57-59.
30. See id. at 56-57 (noting that Lincoln called Congress in April 1861 to meet for a
special session in July).
31. See id. at 59 (5Congress approved, in just over a week, an array of wartime
measures, including funding and authorizing an expanded army and navy.-).
32. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 47 (2004) (discussing the Court’s
affirmation of Lincoln’s emergency measures). The duty to repel sudden attacks signifies an
emergency measure that grants the President the discretion to take actions necessary to resist
a sudden invasion that is waged either against the mainland or against American troops abroad.
See id. at 47-48.
33. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 636 (1863).
34. Id. at 668.
35. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 28, at 56-58.
36. See Act of May 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 264-65; see also supra text accompanying note
22.
37. See The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. at 666 (5That the President, as the Executive
Chief of the Government and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, was the proper
person to make such notification [of a blockade], has not been, and cannot be disputed.-).
38. Id. at 668.
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of a general or limited war, left the Executive, in his capacity as commanderin-chief, with only the power to repel sudden invasions against the nation.39
The Court’s 4urisprudence vested in Congress all offensive powers of the na<
tion.
We have come a long way from these early decisions. Prior to 1936, the
Court established a constitutional blueprint, which embraced the principle of
collective decision-making, or a system of shared powers.40 Presidents today,
however> have the lion’s share of foreign policy making> which has rendered
Congress to the sidelines with little say in the decision-making process. We
have also seen more contemporary executives assert that the Supreme Court
has no power of review when a case involves national security concerns. Harold H. Koh suggests there are three reasons why Presidents always appear to
have the leading hand when asserting a strong dominant role in foreign affairs.41 First, the President takes the initiative primarily by 5construing laws
designed to constrain his actions as authoriBations-—as is evident by the use
of the War Powers Resolution.42 Second, the legislative branch has, more
often than not, complied with or acquiesced in the actions taken or policies
implemented by the Executive.43 And lastly, judicial tolerance; however, as
this Article illustrates, is not tolerance, but instead it is the constitutive role
of the judicial branch.44

III.

CURTISS-WRIGHT—A NEW PATH BECOMES ENSHRINED IN LAW

Curtiss-Wright (1936) marks a sharp departure for the Court, and reveals the Court embarking on a new path to redefine the President’s role in
foreign affairs vis-à-vis the legislative branch. The Court also establishes itself as the institution to reconfigure, and, if necessary, to redefine the scope
39. These early decisions have never been overturned and remain the law of the land
today. See generally Fisher, Domestic Commander in Chief, supra note 17; Adler, supra note
3.
40. See generally The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863); Little v. Barrame,
6 U.S. 170 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800);
United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
41. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs,
in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 158-80 (David Gray
Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996).
42. Id. at 158. Primarily drafted to halt creeping wars like Vietnam, the Resolution
has come to symbolize, because of drafting flaws, statutory authorization undercutting the
effectiveness in restraining the President from initiating hostilities. Id. Consequently, when
the President decides to 5violateFE congressionally imposed procedural constraints in pursuit
of substantive policies that they favor>- he does so under the guise of the Resolution. Id. at
172.
43. 8oh argues that this is evident through 5legislative myopia> inade'uate drafting>
ineffective legislative tools, or sheer lack of political will.- Id. at 158.
44. Fletcher, supra note 1.
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and prerogatives of the President in this area. This new role for both branches
over time has led to a comprehensive national acceptance 5of the systematic
legal entrenchment- of an executive acting unilaterally in foreign policymaking. Essentially, Curtiss-Wright involved the principles of governmental regulation of business and the supremacy of the executive branch in the conduct
of foreign affairs.45 The case held the President’s foreign affairs powers are
not only open-ended, but also inherent in his position as the executive of a
sovereign nation. Following this decision, executives have gained significant
momentum in this area, and, with successive decisions by the judicial branch
we have seen a distinct conjecture in favor of executive power in international relations. In fact, the Curtiss-Wright decision uses sweeping language
that the executive branch regularly cites to support its claim of the power to
act without congressional authorization in foreign policy. The Zivotofsky
Court essentially reverts to the established path of presidential ascendency.
The Court decided Curtiss-Wright at the height of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s 5personaliBation and institutionaliBation of the presidency>which amongst many initiatives included an 5extrovert phase in !merican
foreign policy.-46 This marked the nation’s arrival as the world’s hegemonic
power.47
Yet, how does Curtiss-Wright—a singular decision—influence both the
doctrinal development of the judicial branch and the political development
of the executive branch? Scholars have been decidedly critical of Justice
George .utherland’s theory on the separation of powers, and thus have been
quick to point out that Justice Robert H. Jackson in Youngstown (1952) asserted that much of .utherland’s opinion is dictum.48 Despite this criticism
and the relegated opinion> .utherland’s sweeping language is often cited as
the lynchpin of many of the executive branch’s subse'uent claims of the
power to act without congressional authorization in foreign affairs (from Truman to Obama).
During the 1930s, the Court served as a check on New Deal legislation.49 At every turn in national policy where the cleavage between the old
and new regime was distinct, FDR was confronted with a judiciary predominantly held over from the old order. The Court was now faced with a case
45. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 305-06 (1936).
46. Koh, supra note 41, at 160 (noting that this time period began before the attacks
on Pearl Harbor and ended with the Vietnam War).
47. Koh, supra note 41, at 160; see Fletcher, supra note 1. Geopolitical concerns have
been shown to act as an external constraint on judicial decision-making.
48. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635-36
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
49. See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down New Deal
legislation on the grounds that they characterized unconstitutionally broad delegations of legislative power to the Executive); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935).
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involving executive prerogatives in foreign policymaking. With the reproaches by the Court in the domestic arena, the Court was now positioned
to render yet another decision that might again be in opposition to the commitments of the majority coalition. But the Court’s eventual support of
FHR’s 7ew Heal legislation> coupled with an expanded view of executive
powers in the area of foreign affairs, helped facilitate the federal government’s growth in authority and responsibility.
In response to a potential war breaking out in the Chaco region of South
America, and acting pursuant to the authorization of a joint resolution, President Roosevelt issued Proclamation 208750 in May 1934, forbidding the
shipment of arms to the combatants in the Chaco region.51 Curtiss-Wright
Export Corporation was charged with plotting to sell fifteen machine guns to
Bolivia.52 This sale violated the Proclamation and Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation was indicted for violating the embargo.53
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the congressional
resolution was an unlawful delegation of legislative power,54 a right Congress
was leaving to the Executive’s 5unfettered discretion.-55 According to precedent, broad delegations of power were unconstitutional—the Court’s rea<
soning behind striking down New Deal legislation. Early on in his career,
Justice Sutherland encouraged a broad reading of the Constitution; the Constitution must have the 5capacity for indefinite extension- for those who
came after the Constitution was framed and adopted.56 And it is this position
that underscores the majority opinion for the Court in Curtiss-Wright.

50. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1936) (detailing Joint Resolution 48 Stat. 811).
51. See id. at 312-13 (detailing Presidential Proclamation 2087); see also
Proclamation No. 2087, 48 Stat. 1744 (1934), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14888#axzz1lpVgJyPc (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) A5Forbidding the Shipment
of Arms to the Combatants in the Chaco-@. On November 14, 1935, FDR issued a second
proclamation that revoked the previous proclamation, finding the prohibition on the sale of
arms to Bolivia and Paraguay no longer necessary since the war between the two countries
had come to an end. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 313; see also Proclamation No. 2147, 49
Stat. 3480 (1935), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14978 (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016) A5Revoking the !rms Embargo at the Termination of Hostilities in the
Chaco-@.
52. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 311.
53. Id.
54. This prerogative is a legislative determination, the lawyers argued on behalf of
the Executive, and Congress was leaving this right to the Executive. Id. at 314615. This claim
had judicial support, though Congressional Democrats and the White House were severely
critical of the Court’s decisions. See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 299 U.S. 388 (1935).
55. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 314-15.
56. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 50 (1919).
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This case caused much concern for the administration. The administration was primarily concerned about the subsequent impact on the role between congressional flexibility and executive discretion. Although some administration lawyers argued internally that the Executive should assert a
stronger claim to executive independent authority in the area of foreign affairs, it was left out of the briefs, favoring instead executive discretion.57 According to the government, Congress had the authority to grant the President
the ability to go to war if he believed that in doing so it would reestablish
peace between nations that were at war. If this was the case, 5it Fwould be]
the President and not Congress who decided whether this country should go
to war.-58 But nothing in any of the briefs suggested that Curtiss-Wright
would become a foundation on which to show judicial support for the Executive’s control over foreign policy. In fact, administration lawyers drafting
the brief asserted the President’s 5conduct…of the foreign relations of the
Government-—a phrase 'uoted in the Court’s opinion in Panama Refining—
was more restrained, and circumscribed an area of legislation, whether due
to settled principle, access to facts, or even the Court’s own language> where
the delegation principle was confined to this situation.59
Justice Sutherland was a strict constructionist, aligned with the Court’s
conservative side, and was often viewed as the leader of the conservative bloc
when a clear divide existed on the bench.60 With a new constitutional order
under way> .utherland’s early theories on the President’s external powers
had matured, and a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign affairs
now existed. :n .utherland’s early writings> he did not say much on the mat<
ter of presidential constitutional powers. But in Curtiss-Wright, Sutherland
asserted that the Executive had the sole authority to conduct the nation’s for<
eign affairs.61
Interestingly, while Justice Sutherland valued the doctrine of stare decisis, he asserted that precedent was not a fixed pathway, since it is the opinion only of the person who came before and that person stipulated where the
pathway should be.62 Path dependency of precedent in constitutional law, for
57. R. Walton Moore, Memorandum on Neutrality, in DEBATING FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT’S FOREIGN POLICIES 1933-1945, at 95, 97-99 (2005).
58. Brief for Appellees at 20, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 416-26 (1936) (No. 98) (The parties included in this brief are John S. Allard, Clarence
W. Webster, and Samuel J. Abelow).
59. Brief for United States at 8, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 422-25 (1936) (No. 98) (quoting Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 422-25 (1935)).
60. PETER G. RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 79-80
(2003). Justices McReynolds, Devanter, Butler, and Sutherland were instrumental in striking
down Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. Id. at 80.
61. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319.
62. Senator George Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, Address Before the
American Bar Association (Aug. 28, 1912).
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Sutherland, was not a controlling factor; and constitutional decision-making
on the Court would therefore be based in part on a 4ustice’s personal policy
preferences or strategic objectives.63 Sutherland, assigned majority opinion
writer,64 instituted a new constitutional order when he argued the President
had the sole responsibility to negotiate with foreign powers.65
Sutherland contended that there are fundamental differences between
the powers employed by the federal government in the area of domestic affairs and external or foreign matters.66 Foreign affairs, Justice Sutherland asserted, necessitate a different set of rules and standards, so, the powers
granted to Congress could be exercised or delegated to the President and are
not limited to the express and implied powers constitutionally granted.67
Sutherland added that any limitations were only applicable to internal affairs.
Furthermore, Sutherland noted, the President exercised 5plenary and exclu<
sive power>- which is independent of any legislative authority> since he was
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.68
Justice Sutherland wove another concept into his conclusion, one that
was practically absent from his Constitutional Power and World Affairs69
manuscript. He maintained that there is a significant limitation when exercising power in the international arena. This rhetorical caveat was developed in
his most famous passage of all. In what some have called 5ill-considered
dicta>-70 9ustice .utherland invoked Congressman 9ohn Marshall’s reference
to the President as the sole organ of American foreign policy in a speech
Marshall delivered to the House of Representatives in 1800.71 In that speech,
Marshall asserted the President was the sole organ of communication,72 but
.utherland’s reference to Marshall’s remark implies that the President makes
foreign policy unilaterally.
:t is 'uite surprising that .utherland would misrepresent Marshall’s ref<
erence to such a degree in order to ground his own assertions in a historical
63. Id.; see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 974 (2005) (the point here is not just that judicial opinions reveal the
differences among the Justices but rather that the Justices know they may assert their differences in their respective opinions if they chose to do so).
64. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Understanding Curtiss-Wright, 31 L. & HIST. REV.
653 (2013). Purcell’s article evaluates Chief 9ustice Hughes’s reasons for assigning the ma<
jority opinion to Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright.
65. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319; see also Fletcher, supra note 1.
66. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 315-16.
67. Id. at 319-20.
68. Id.
69. Sutherland, supra note 62.
70. Adler, supra note 3, at 40.
71. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 6 ANNALS OF CONG. (1800)).
72. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800).
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frame. When read in context, Marshall meant only that the President communicates American foreign policy to other nations after it has been
adopted.73 Marshall clearly meant that the Executive was the sole organ in
implementing—that is, merely announcing, not formulating—American foreign policy.74 Thus, the Executive would be the sole organ of communication;
the nation would be speaking with a single voice.75
.utherland’s distortion speaks volumes for Marshall’s theory because>
as Chief Justice, he never once invoked the sole organ doctrine in defense of
unilateral executive power in foreign affairs, though he had many opportunities to do so.76 :n short> articulating the nation’s foreign policy to other countries did not carry with it any form of inherent power according to Marshall.
9ustice .utherland’s reliance upon Marshall’s speech as a foundation of the
sole organ doctrine is thus untenable. Get> it is a measure of .utherland’s
mischief that confusion about Marshall’s speech has been pervasive ever
since. !s such Marshall’s account of the President as the sole organ of foreign affairs is commonly distorted.
Given the tra4ectory of 9ustice .utherland’s theory and his assertions in
his written opinion for the Court, the decision rendered in Curtiss-Wright was
perhaps an observable evolution of his obvious schema, but not necessarily
predetermined. 9ustice .utherland’s ma4ority opinion is evidence of a change
of heart from his 1919 defense of Congress’s authority and role in foreign
affairs against federalism and the 5narrow-construction attack to an assertion
of the foreign-affairs authority of the President that stresses its independence
of Congress.-77 This change of heart78 might be attributed, as discussed below, to the exogenous factors—the government’s argument> historical prac<
tice, and the geopolitical impact of the growth of Fascism—that .utherland’s
opinion embraces.
/n the initial reading of 9ustice .utherland’s opinion> it is difficult to
ascertain what his assertions have to do with the question of delegation. How-

73. See Fisher, supra note 3.
74. See id. (5Although it [is] the president’s constitutional duty to carry out the law,
including treaties, ‘Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode.’-@ (quoting Marshall’s
speech)). Indeed, first and foremost, Marshall was referring to the President’s authority to
5communicate>- not 5make- American foreign policy. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800).
75. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800).
76. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 142-43 (discussing Marshall’s approach to foreign
affairs cases as Chief Justice).
77. H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 195, 222 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds.,
2009).
78. See Fletcher, supra note 1 (Sutherland’s early work warns about the growth of
presidential powers, but this opinion is clear evidence of him changing his mind).
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ever> if one takes note of H. 9efferson Powell’s reading of 9ustice .uther<
land’s opinion79 and grant Justice Sutherland some latitude, one can conclude, since foreign affairs powers do not originate from the Constitution,
they cannot be defined by it and are therefore plenary except when they are
limited by 5applicable provisions of the Constitution.-80 Continuing with this
line of thought, Sutherland can then assert that the distribution of foreign affairs powers are not created; rather, the Constitution renders the Executive
5the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations>-81 and places few limitations on the management of foreign affairs.
The President’s power in this area is therefore 5delicate> plenary and exclu<
sive.-82 If the Executive is the primary decision-maker in the realm of foreign
policymaking—in the sense that Justice Sutherland is arguing that this is
structural in an extra-constitutional sense—and the Executive is responsible
for formulating that policy, then it naturally follows that a delegation rule
constructed to protect Congress’s role in delineating policy is 'uite simply
and plausibly> according to .utherland’s assertion> inapplicable.83 Moreover,
and this is the point at which Justice Sutherland embraces elements of the
government’s argument> when Congress legislates in foreign affairs> it ap<
propriately takes into account the President’s supremacy> in principle and in
practice, of intelligence, secrecy, and negotiation, which are argued to be essential constraints to the success of foreign policy.84
Curtiss-Wright was a case decided during a period of modernization for
the presidency, but it was also a time that permanently ended American isolation from European and world affairs. In the 1930s, Congress and the country were determined to remain an isolationist nation and stay out of the war
raging in Europe. But President Roosevelt, acutely aware of the impact of
Hitler’s progression, attempted to ally with France and Great Britain against
Hitler’s and Mussolini’s regimes. So the political timing of Curtiss-Wright
was not only a determining factor on the autonomy of the President’s power
to respond to the situation at hand and the Chaco war more broadly, but also
how the Court would weigh the exogenous constraints when reaching its decision, as is evident by the geopolitical context of the case.85 This constrain-

79. Powell, supra note 77, at 195-96.
80. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 321-22.
84. Id.
85. One way in which FDR wanted to counter Fascist advances was in the discretionary control over neutrality. An arms embargo against Italy and Ethiopia, for example, would
achieve Roosevelt’s agenda. See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 193261945, at 107 (1995). Interestingly the press discussed the case in its
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ing external factor also accounts for Justice Sutherland reframing and reformulating an opinion that both embraces an expanded role for the Executive
and united the judicial bench.86 This case demonstrates that the juncture of
legal and political time created a constitutional moment that presents the
Court with an opportunity to redefine the Executive’s powers through the
mutual construction process.87
Advocates of executive power have long advanced notions of drawing
power from outside of the Constitution, notably Theodore Roosevelt—with
his stewardship theory of the presidency—and Alexander Hamilton in Pacificus No. 1.88 The Curtiss-Wright Court, however, offers a nuanced interpretation to the original constitutional order. In effect, the constitutional order adhered to in early judicial cases is supplemented by a new order, one in favor
of the practical reality of a strong executive in the area of foreign affairs.89
.cholars have been highly critical of .utherland’s theory on the separa<
tion of powers and, accordingly, have been quick to point out that Justice
Robert H. Jackson in the Steel Seizure case (1952) relegated much of Sutherland’s opinion as dictum.90 Hespite this criticism> .utherland’s misappro<
priation of Marshall’s speech is so entrenched that it is the basis of many of
the executive branch’s subse'uent claims to unilateral discretion in foreign
affairs.
Even though Congress intentionally ignored the Curtiss-Wright decision when it insisted that it alone may grant the Executive broad discretionary
power,91 and while the case also played a rather limited role as precedent in
the first few years of its decision,92 Curtiss-Wright did enable Sutherland to
speak again to the role of the Executive vis-à-vis the legislative branch in the
geopolitical context. The Washington Post reported that the opinion in Curtiss-Wright vindicated a President’s claim to a vast power in foreign affairs and> more specifically> Roosevelt’s
'uest for 5authority for him to exercise wide discretion in limiting exports to combatants.- See
Powell, supra note 77, at 225 (quoting Robert C. Albright, Highest Court Affirms Arms Embargo Act, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1936, at 1). The Washington Post emphasized that the case
5was generally believed to open the door for a more vigorous neutrality course> providing the
approach is discretionary with the President> rather than mandatory.- Id.
86. See Purcell, supra note 64.
87. KAHN & KERSCH, supra note 4.
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library, 1937). Hamilton famously asserted executive energy and dispatch.
89. Fletcher, supra note 1.
90. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635-36
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
91. See Powell, supra note 77, at 226 (5Sutherland’s opinion left Panama Refining
and Schechter Poultry untouched, and it was the Supreme Court’s famous recession from its
narrow view of federal power beginning in March 1937, not Curtiss-Wright, that ultimately
proved to have freed Congress and the executive from the constraints that the 1935 delegation
decisions appeared to have fashioned.-).
92. Powell, supra note 77, at 226.
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area of foreign affairs. The decision also established a newly constructed constitutional order for executive supremacy in this area. !lthough .utherland’s
opinion insinuates the President can make foreign policy unilaterally, the impact of this case is not immediate. In fact, the effect of the holding is its evolution as precedent over time,93 and how the sole organ doctrine become embedded in future unilateral claims of broad discretionary power by Presidents.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer94 provides what some would
contend is the end point to the influential role of Curtiss-Wright.95 This is
quite a compelling statement, since those who argue this point emphasize
that, by 1952, the delegation issue had retreated in significance and the specific holding in Curtiss-Wright was irrelevant.96 However, the judicial record
suggests something quite different. United States v. Belmont97 and United
States v. Pink98—two cases decided immediately following Curtiss-Wright—
in conjunction with Johnson v. Eisentrager,99 are cases that illustrate the
Court’s continued devotion to .utherland’s reluctance to be 5in haste-100 to
interfere with the President’s handling of international relations.101

93. Mark Graber Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide during the
Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 41-42.
94. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
95. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 77> at 227. 5The Supreme Court’s celebrated decision invalidating President [sic] Truman’s seizure of the steel industry in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, decided in 1952, marks an appropriate end-point for an examination of
Curtiss-Wright’s immediate impact.96. Powell, supra note 77, at 227.
97. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
98. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
99. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
100. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936).
101. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324, was decided only four months after Curtiss-Wright,
and involved the validity of an executive agreement with the Soviet government. Id. at 326.
Sutherland applied the same reasoning used in Curtiss-Wright to Belmont: favoring once again
his developed distinction between the external and internal powers when he concluded that
the national government had the authority to enter into the agreement and invoked the language, while not naming specifically Curtiss-Wright, that 5in respect of what was done here,
the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that [national] government.- Id. at
330. In Pink, 315 U.S. at 203, Justice Douglas expressly quotes from Curtiss-Wright the explanation of the Executive’s role as sole organ, and reaffirms that the President has the power
to make binding international agreements without Senate ratification. Id. at 229. Justice Douglas went a step further and held that Congress had 5tacitly- approved of the executive agreement. Id. at 227. Pink was a case decided when World War II was in full progress and the
United States was fully invested. The real impact of Pink was seen in the Court’s decisionmaking forty years later when it decided Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

322

IV.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37-2

UNILATERAL CLAIMS OF EMERGENCY POWERS DURING WORLD
WAR II

The next time the Court heard a challenge to presidential claims of unilateral foreign policymaking was with the Japanese Internment Cases.102 It
was with this set of cases the Court entrenches the new constitutional order
established with the Curtiss-Wright case. These cases came out of a time
when many people in America, reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, believed that Imperial Japan was waging a full-scale attack on the West Coast, and the attack was imminent.103 Questioning the loyalty of ethnic Japanese living in the United States, fueled primarily by the
racial prejudices of General John L. DeWitt, there was growing support by
Americans to intern the Japanese.104
As a result, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order (EO) 9066 in
early 1942, sanctioning military commanders to designate 5military areas- at
their discretion> 5from which any or all persons may be excluded.-105 This
authorization sent nearly 120,000 Japanese Nationals and Japanese Americans to internment camps. In a cluster of cases—Hirabayashi v. United
States,106 Yasui v. United States,107 Korematsu v. United States,108 and Ex
parte Mitsuye Endo109—the Court considered whether President Roosevelt
had exceeded his authority by claiming emergency powers, or whether it was
crucial to set in place an exclusion order due to military necessity. Essentially
the Court was tasked with balancing President Roosevelt’s unilateral claim
of emergency powers during a war vis-à-vis the suspension of Japanese!mericans’ constitutional right to civil liberties. The Court found in Roosevelt’s favor> asserting the President had statutory and constitutional authority
to act during exigent circumstances.110 With the nation at war, the Court reasoned, in both the Hirabayashi and Yasui cases, that the application of curfews against members of a minority group were constitutional: 5FWEe cannot
sit in 4udgment on the military re'uirements of that hour.-111

102. See infra text accompanying notes 104-07.
103. See Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 933, 937-38 (2004) (discussing various arrests and evacuations of Japanese Americans
on the West Coast post-Pearl Harbor).
104. Id. at 938.
105. Exec. Order No. 9066, (Feb. 19, 1942), 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).
106. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
107. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
108. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
109. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 111-15.
111. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion in Korematsu,112 which
re4ected the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination. Siding with the government,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the relocation order because it protected the nation against espionage, and this was sufficient justification to
outweigh the rights of Korematsu.113 The Court reasoned that the EO and the
actions it authorized were a constitutional exercise of the Executive’s war
powers.114
While the actions taken by key decision-makers at the time have been
justly criticized and shown to be discriminatory, the Court reasoned that these
decision-makers are often faced with threats to the nation that call for extraordinary measures. Courts> at times> may 5implicitly rely on the good faith
of executive officials . . . as the unstated basis for overlooking civil liberties
problems with the legal positions that the executive officials have staked
out>- which is what we find with the :nternment cases.115
Endo is the only internment case that the Court, unanimously, finds in
favor of the plaintiff. But, the Court ruled only on statutory grounds that EO
9066 and 9102 cannot be construed to give the War Relocation Authority
A5WR!-@ the power 5to sub4ect citiBens who are concededly loyal- to deten<
tion in a relocation center.116 One day after the Endo decision FDR announced Public Proclamation No. 21 on December 19, 1944, which ended
the exclusion order on the Western Defense Command.117

V. YOUNGSTOWN—A BOOK END TO THE SOLE ORGAN DOCTRINE?
A few years later, the Youngstown case of 1952 marked an exceptional
moment wherein the Court, during a time of war, used judicial review to
check broad unilateral assertions of power. On April 8, 1952, President Truman announced that, to avoid a labor strike, the federal government would
seize all steel mills involved in a labor dispute that were planning to strike.118
While Presidents in the past had seized plants, never before had the government, during a time of peace, apprehended a major portion of an industry.
Nor had an executive laid claim to inherent presidential powers under Article

112. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
113. Id. at 219-20.
114. Id. at 217-18.
115. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
WIS. L. REV. 273, 294 (2003).
116. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944).
117. Proclamation No. 21, 10 Fed. Reg. 53 (Dec. 17, 1944).
118. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 583
(1952).
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II of the Constitution to defend a seizure when a statute—the Taft-Hartley
Act119—provided an alternate and legal method for preventing the strike.120
Truman’s actions created a political and constitutional crisis that solic<
ited fundamental questions about the role of the Executive and the nature of
presidential power: Did the President act with legal authority? If he did not,
what role, if any, did Congress play in passing judgment? And finally, did
that judgment fall to the Court? Youngstown presented the Court with an opportunity to reexamine the balance of authority among the branches. And,
more importantly, this was an occasion for the Court to reconsider and potentially redefine the scope of unilateral power in light of almost twenty years
of unparalleled exploitation of executive authority.
9ustice Robert H. 9ackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown has become the leading authority—dividing the Executive’s authority into three
categories—for how the Court delineates the relationship between Congress
and the President and how the Court determines whether the actions taken by
the Executive are legitimate.121 Youngstown outlined the limit of the executive branch’s reach and extent of power when acting as commander-in-chief.
,ltimately> the Court found that the President’s military power did not extend
to labor disputes.
Youngstown took place against a backdrop of two decades in which
Presidents had steadily expanded their power, and the judiciary had all but
sanctioned its continued growth. This development of expanded power led
Truman to assert he had the authority to seize the mills. Truman believed that
the seizure was necessary to safeguard the continued need of supplies to
American troops in Korea and to support the healthy economy the nation was
enjoying.122 However, the Korean Conflict soon became a war in every practical sense. The Youngstown decision was, by all accounts, an unexpected
decision: Why would the New Deal-Fair Deal Court that had previously been
so receptive to the exercise of broad presidential authority reverse course and
restrain inherent executive power?
The Youngstown decision is a sharp rebuke to Truman’s seiBure and an
attempt by the judicial branch to immobilize the accumulation of power by
the Executive. 9ustice 9ackson’s concurring opinion both criticiBed and re<
4ected 9ustice .utherland’s Curtiss-Wright opinion. Jackson observed that the
language used by .utherland merely insinuates> 5the President might act in
external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act

119. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 135 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2006)).
120. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586.
121. Id. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 582-83 (majority opinion).
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contrary to an !ct of Congress.-123 Jackson asserted that much of Sutherland’s opinion was dicta and was not relevant to the issues presented in the
present case.124
Upon reexamination, the Youngstown case was not a simple case of rebuke and was not as sweeping as the broad language may initially suggest.
In general, Justice Black125 interpreted the words of the Bill of Rights literally
to thwart government intrusion with personal liberties; during wartime, however, civil liberty claims had to give way before the needs of the government.
This was the reasoning in 9ustice Black’s ma4ority opinion in Korematsu;
when the war powers of the government conflicted with individual rights, the
safety of the nation necessitated the sacrifice of the latter.126 It was therefore
not unthinkable to expect 9ustice Black to sustain Truman’s seiBure of the
steel mills, given the hostilities in Korea, international concerns, and the administration’s declarations that steel was indispensable to the nation and its
allies.127 Truman’s delineation of executive power, however, was too sweeping for the nation, and strong public opinion128 opposing his policies constrained the Court’s decision. Ultimately, the Youngstown Court sided with
Congress against the President’s assertion of unilateral powers and found no
congressional statute authoriBing Truman’s actions.129
Justice Jackson split from the purely textual approach advocated by Justice Black> deducing that: 5[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their dis4unction or con4unction with those of Congress.-130
This logic led Justice Jackson to set out a three-tier framework, which not
only addresses the relationship between Congress and the presidency, but
also stipulates how the Court will determine whether the actions taken by the
Executive are legitimate.131 As many before have noted, Jackson divided the
123. Id. at 636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS
AND VALUES 193761947, at 208, 258 (1948); see VIRGINIA VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, HUGO
BLACK: THE ALABAMA YEARS 3-108 (1972). For Justice Black’s appointment to the Court> see
William E. Leuchtenburg, A Klansman Joins the Court: The Appointment of Hugo L. Black,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1973).
126. See supra notes 112-14.
127. See generally THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, PAPERS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN
1949-1953, presidency.ucsb.edu/harry_s_truman.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
128. This check on presidential power is contingent on the general public expressing
its trepidations and articulating that sentiment to the courts as well as to Congress. This prerequisite places a heavy burden on the individual citizen: it expects them to be cognizant of
the use of executive power, to evaluate its use, to ask the legislature or judicial branch to rein
in that power, and to give its full support to the constraints imposed by either of the two
branches.
129. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
130. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 635-38.
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President’s authority into three distinct categories. Tier one asserts that presidential power is at its Benith 5FwEhen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriBation of Congress- because 5it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.-132 In such a
situation, the President is dependent on his own powers as well as those delegated to him by Congress.
Tier two> known as the 5Twilight Zone>- is of particular interest to
scholars. When the Executive 5acts in the absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority- then he has only his independent powers. But
when there is 5concurrent authority- between the legislative and executive
branches or there is uncertainty in the distribution of powers, then a zone of
twilight exists. !nd 5congressional inertia> indifference or 'uiescence- may
at times 5enable> if not invite- unilateral decision-making.133 If the President’s authority was in doubt> the legality of his act was 5likely to depend on
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.-134 It is this point—and to some degree, the two other
tiers—that shows the Court’s acceptance and willingness to consider external
forces. Moreover, this decision also demonstrates how the Court might be
constrained by exogenous forces.
Tier three stipulates that presidential power is at its lowest ebb when it
is 5incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress>- as the Executive may only rely upon his own constitutional authority.135 In this case,
the President depends on his own constitutional powers, which excludes
whatever constitutional authority the legislative branch could have over the
issue. In this instance, the Court can then uphold an executive’s action only
by finding that Congress could not act in the situation.136
Given the Court’s use of Curtiss-Wright as controlling precedent over
developmental time, Truman clearly expected an auspicious ruling and therefore took the decision as a personal censure.137 However> the Court’s ma4ority
was not swayed by Truman’s claim that the crisis confronting the nation was

132. Id. at 635.
133. Id. at 637.
134. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. This could either be an indication of an expanded
view of legislative deferrals, or it is simply politically unpopular for Congress to be seen as a
war hawk. For an expanded discussion of legislative deferrals, see GEORGE I. LOVELL,
LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2003); see also Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
135. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
136. Id. at 637638. The extent to which the third category is applied is exemplified by
President Reagan’s role in the Iran-Contra affair.
137. See MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 214-15 (Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1941).
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grave enough to justify an assertion of inherent executive power to seize private property. The Youngstown Court was therefore willing to scrutinize unilateral claims and find in favor of collective decision-making when those assertions directly cross over into the domestic sphere. Despite the Youngstown
ruling, Presidents have—with large success138—advanced 9ustice 9ackson’s
three-tier analysis as the legal authority to act unilaterally.
For almost fifty years following the Curtiss-Wright decision, the Court
decided countless cases that offered a definition of the scope of executive
power in the area of foreign affairs. The Court signaled that the President as
the sole organ enjoyed inherent, as well as, implied powers, largely unimpeded, to control the challenging terrain of international affairs, as he deemed
most effective.139 !nd the next set of cases illustrates the Court’s role in reen<
gineering presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs.

138. For example, when President Jimmy Carter declared his intention to unilaterally
terminate a defense treaty with Taiwan, his legal authority to terminate a treaty without the
advice and consent of the Senate was called into question. When this case reached the Supreme
Court, Justice Powell echoed Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, stating, 5FiEf the
Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so.- Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979). Similar decisions were handed down in the cases involving the
Reagan administration and its use of the war power in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada, and
in the Persian Gulf. For example, in a war powers case involving President Reagan and Nicaragua, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted 5Congress has formidable weapons at its disposal—
the power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond those available in the Third
Branch . . . . Congress expressly allowed the President to spend federal funds to support paramilitary operations in 7icaragua.- Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Ginsberg, J., concurring); see also Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp.
893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
139. Curtiss-Wright has been cited and extended far beyond the traditional claims of
unfettered discretion in foreign policymaking. E.g., Justice Scalia, dissenting argued in favor
of the constitutionality of the firing of a CIA technician who publicly acknowledged his homosexuality. In justifying his position Scalia referred to 5the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the [executive] as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.- Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 614-15 (1988) (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). .imilarly> 9ustice /’Connor> dissenting> relied on
Curtiss-Wright when she argued in favor of the discharge of the homosexual CIA employee:
5The authority of the Hirector of Central :ntelligence to control access to sensitive national
security information by discharging employees deemed to be untrustworthy flows primarily
from this constitutional power of the President . . .- which in turn 5lie at the core of ‘the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations.’- Id. at 605-06.

328

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

VI.

[Vol. 37-2

FREEDOM TO ACT—EXALTING PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Dames & Moore v. Regan140 and Regan v. Wald141 provide us with another occasion in which to evaluate the Court’s role in reconstituting the au<
thority of the Executive’s prerogative to act unilaterally. In Dames & Moore,
the Court argued the Executive’s claim to an executive agreement, which
declared a national emergency and froze Iranian assets, was grounded in statutory authorization since the legislature tacitly endorsed the Executive’s
agreement.142 The Court reasoned> the 5general tenor of Congress’ legislation
in this area- allocated broad discretionary authority to the Executive.143 Justice William H. Rehn'uist> writing for the ma4ority> asserted that 5FpEast prac<
tice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to
and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action]
had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .’-144
The Court also maintained that from the perspective of public policy,
the Executive must have the autonomy to act; in this case, the need to use
froBen assets as 5bargaining chips- in delicate negotiations.145 The Court declared that if such a power was not granted to the President> 5the Federal
Government as a whole [would] lack[] the power exercised by the President.-146 Relying explicitly on 9ustice 9ackson’s concurrence in Youngtown,
the Dames & Moore Court concluded Congress’ failure to pass a statute ar<
ticulating disapproval was tantamount to an invitation to the Executive to act
unilaterally.147 For the Dames & Moore Court, congressional silence was indistinguishable to the sanctioning of presidential initiatives.
The Dames & Moore decision was an engineered shift in authority from
Congress to the Executive by the Court. And, since the opinion rested on
statutes that did not directly speak to the issue, the decision illustrated the
Court’s recognition of broad presidential power in international relations.
While the Youngstown Court did not speak explicitly to the issue of inherent
powers, the Dames & Moore Court confirmed the relevance of Justice Jackson’s concurrence when it asserted that the Executive possesses inherent
powers when responding to international emergencies.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669-74.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 688 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)).
Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 674.
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79.
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In Haig v. Agee,148 the Court asserted the Carter administration interpreted the Passport Act, which granted to the Secretary of State the power to
issue and revoke passports. Haig involved the administration revoking the
passport of Philip Agee, an ex-CIA agent who was releasing classified information, with serious implications for our national security.149
The Haig Court relied on Curtiss-Wright when it sanctioned presidential 5[m]easures to protect the secrecy of our Government’s foreign intelli<
gence operations.-150 The Court simply upheld the Executive’s interpretation
of the Passport Act.151 While the Court avoided demarcating the precise
scope of the Executive’s power as sole organ, the Court did work into the
opinion the sole organ doctrine language from Curtiss-Wright to uphold the
President’s asserted interpretation of the law> which thus enabled the Executive to achieve an objective not permitted by the law.152 In fact, the administration cited Curtiss-Wright as the authority for which to interpret the Passport !ct given 5the volatile nature of problems confronting the Executive in
foreign policy and national defense.-153 By permitting the Executive the discretion to renegotiate and define the bounds of those laws, which were enacted to impose limits on the President’s ob4ectives based on the unpredicta<
bility of the problems he would encounter, the Court was exploiting CurtissWright to further a precedent that would permit the Executive to remain the
governing authority in determining the scope and direction of national security affairs in spite of legislative resurgence.154
The Court’s decision in Haig and the precedent set is further strengthened in Regan v. Wald. The Regan Court found exceptions to justify and
sanction broad discretionary authority to the Executive when President
Ronald Reagan restricted travel to Cuba because of national security needs—
the ever-pervasive Cold War.155 The Court reasoned that Congress authorized
148. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 286 (1981).
149. Id. at 280.
150. Id. at 307-08. Interestingly this is not the first time that Curtiss-Wright is utilized
to sanction presidential secrecy. See also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 551
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29
(1971); Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (asserting the
Executive> 5both as Commander-in-Chief and as the 7ation’s organ for foreign affairs, has
available intelligence services whose reports neither are nor ought to be published to the
world.- Id. See also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605-06 (1988).
151. Haig, 453 U.S. at 306.
152. Id. at 291.
153. Id. See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). In a concurring opinion Justice Kennedy singled out Curtiss-Wright, and argued the previous decisions of the Court 5stand for the proposition that we must interpret constitutional protections
in light of the undoubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its legitimate
power and authority abroad.- Id. at 277.
154. See, e.g., War Powers Act of 1970, 50 U.S.C. §§1541-1548 (2016).
155. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 230-44 (1984).
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the President’s actions>156 and sanctioned them with, as Steel Seizure phrased
it> the 5widest latitude of 4udicial interpretation.-157 Even though the legislature proclaimed a dominant role by enacting provisions to 5tie the hands- of
the President and fence in the far-reaching scope of presidential authority,
the Regan Court found in favor of the Executive.158 Ultimately it was up to
the Court to determine the scope and parameters of the Executive. As such,
by granting more power to the Executive the Court stripped the authority of
the legislative branch to statutorily determine what checks and limits would
be placed on executive powers.
Curtiss-Wright was utilized by the Regan Court to establish a new line
of precedent of executive branch interpretation and enforcement of the law
that is not always consistent with legislative intent, but is favorable to the
Executive’s policy initiatives. !nd> despite Congress’s post-Vietnam legislative (War Powers Resolution of 1973) assertiveness to rein in the powers
of the President in foreign affairs> the Court’s recent decisions in Dames &
Moore and Regan decided that this kind of opposition had essentially run its
course.

VII.

WAR ON TERROR—A ROBUST REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY
CONCERNS AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

Following the Court’s decisions in the 1010s and the two decades that
followed, the Court refined its use of Curtiss-Wright as a case from which to
draw authority. The Court would employ Curtiss-Wright not as a means to
assert that executives were free to roam at large, but rather as a way to declare
Presidents were using implied powers to appropriately deal with mounting
national security concerns. And the detainee cases show just this.
The Court continues to adhere to the constitutional order established in
1936, but worked with the 5repackaged version- of Curtiss-Wright as it
handed down its initial rulings in the detainee cases. However, as President
George W. Bush asserted unreviewable unilateral power and became more
marginalized from the regime, the Court was politically strengthened to render a more robust review of the administration’s detention policies when it
heard Boumediene in 2008.
The detainee cases appraise the controversial assertion of unilateral
power exerted during the War on Terror by the Bush administration—policies vis-à-vis the capture, detention, and legal processing of suspected terrorists since 2004. In the end, the Court sided with the Bush administration on
fundamental constitutional grounds, but constrained it statutorily.
156. Id. at 232.
157. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
158. Wald, 468 U.S. at 244.
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The juncture of legal and political time provided the Court with an opportunity to change the course taken by the executive branch and require a
more dominant role by the legislative branch, but the Court, taking into account the external constraints> ultimately sanctioned the President’s asser<
tions, but only statutorily. However, the Court did reconstitute a new baseline: judicial evaluation of executive branch framing and management of a
unique war may necessitate actions contrary to the standards established by
the Court post-1936. This baseline would become a cautionary tale for the
incoming Obama administration, which remained guarded in relying on
Curtiss-Wright as a standard.
Post-1032 the court’s 4urisprudence was to support the President’s use
of emergency and war powers.159 The discretionary latitude afforded to the
President is particularly evident in light of the federal court’s response to
President Bush’s assault on the War on Terror. Even though the President
sought and received congressional support for many of the actions taken to
combat this war, the White House did not suggest, at any point, that it needed
congressional approval for the policies it implemented.160 In fact, President
Bush, on numerous occasions, emphasized his unilateral authority to conduct
a unique war how he saw fit.
In June 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in three related cases: Rasul v.
Bush,161 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,162 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla.163 These three cases
addressed the President’s anti-terror initiatives and executive claims of unilateral power. The administration also claimed that the President’s authority
was unreviewable by the judiciary and could not be checked by a co-ordinate
branch of government.
The Bush administration claimed that the President is granted broad
war-making powers when acting in the constitutional capacity of commander-in-chief to conduct a successful campaign.164 Moreover, the administration claimed that the !uthoriBation for ,se of Military Force A5!,MF-@

159. See, e.g., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 138 (1990) (5The Burger Court had several opportunities to read Curtiss-Wright strictly and thereby to rein in this executive practice. On each
occasion, however, it ruled in the president’s favor, approving rather than rejecting his selfserving construction of the statute in question.-).
160. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority
to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor
or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 506 (2002) (noting that in the past, 5when
Congress has actually authorized troop deployments in hostilities, Presidents have taken the
position that such legislation, although welcome, was not constitutionally necessary-).
161. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
162. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
163. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
164. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 160.
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Act,165 a joint resolution passed by Congress immediately following the attacks of September 11, granted the Executive considerable latitude in the
conduct of hostilities. The Act also granted to the Executive the authority to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those who aided or abetted in
the terrorist attacks.166
Rasul v. Bush was the first habeas corpus case to reach the Court. The
question before the Court in Rasul was whether it had jurisdiction to hear
legal appeals filed on behalf of the foreign citizens who were being held at
Guantanamo Bay’s naval base.167 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion and held that because Guantanamo Bay was territory under American jurisdiction, it thus entitled the prisoners to habeas corpus hearings.168
More importantly> .tevens reasoned> the petitioners’ rights to habeas corpus
were not dependent on their citizenship status.169
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld170 (5Hamdi II-) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit relied on Curtiss-Wright, asserting that when weighing national security concerns against individual civil rights, the President wields
5plenary and exclusive power.-171 Citing Youngstown, the Fourth Circuit also
said this power is superior when the President acts 5with statutory authorization from Congress.-172 While the court did not specify which statutes might
have authoriBed the President’s actions> it went on to affirm the Executive’s
constitutional power—as supported by the Prize Cases and Dames &
Moore—to not only conduct military operations, but also to determine who
would be considered an enemy combatant, and settle the rules governing the
treatment of such individuals.173 And, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld174 A5Hamdi III-@
in 2003, the same court concluded that the President had near unfettered discretion when faced with a national emergency, and it was inappropriate for
the Judiciary to weigh down presidential decisions with what the court called
the 5‘panoply of encumbrances associated with civil litigation.’-175
When Hamdi III reached the Supreme Court, the Court was unable to
agree on a unanimous line of reasoning, which resulted in a six to three vote.
165. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
166. Id.
167. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).
168. Id. at 480-81.
169. Id. at 484-85.
170. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
171. Id. at 281 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936)).
172. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S.
579, 635-37 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
173. Id. at 281-82.
174. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
175. Id. at 465 (quoting Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283-84).
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However, the majority opinion noted that the AUMF granted the President
the authority to detain an American citizen as an enemy combatant because
the Executive’s actions were pursuant to an act of Congress.176 Specifically,
9ustice .andra Hay /’Connor wrote that because 5the !,MF is explicit con<
gressional authorization for the detention of individuals>- it gives the Executive the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force against 5nations>
organiBations> or persons.-177 /’Connor, however, reminded the Bush administration that the Rehn'uist Court would not become a 5rubber stampfor an administration that was attempting to 5condense power into a single
branch of government.-178
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Court made clear that presidential actions
were, indeed, subject to judicial scrutiny, placing some constraints on the
President’s claim to unfettered power.179 Ultimately, however, the Court declined, on procedural grounds, to rule in this case.180 9ustice .tevens’s dissent
in this case noted that the arguments stated by the Court could not justify
avoiding its duty to respond to the question the case raised: Did the President
have the authority to detain Padilla by claiming a broad inherent or emergency power?181 Justice .tevens maintained> 5FtEhis is an exceptional case
that we clearly have 4urisdiction to decide.-182 He further argued that the case
before the Court gave the Justices an opportunity to review the actions taken
by the administration and the constitutional claims made by the President
when he invoked inherent power—terms echoing Curtiss-Wright—to deny
Padilla his civil liberties in the name of national security.183
Ultimately, the amalgamation of Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla offer the
most definitive statement yet of what powers are afforded to the President
when detaining enemy combatants. The Court, constrained by extenuating
circumstances, found in favor of Bush.
The Roberts Court was left to answer the important questions left unanswered by the Rehnquist Court when it ruled in Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla.
176. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
177. Id. at 517-18 (internal quotations omitted).
178. Id. at 536.
179. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (explaining that the Court granted
certiorari to review, in part, the legality of Padilla’s military detainment pursuant to the President’s determination that he is an 5enemy combatant-).
180. Id. at 451.
181. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. See id. at 461 (5[T]his case is singular not only because it calls into question decisions made by the Secretary himself [under the President’s order], but also because those
decisions have created a unique and unprecedented threat to the freedom of every American
citizen.-); see also Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 465 (5Even more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on
the Executive by the rule of law.-).
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For example, no five Justices could settle on the exact kind of legal process
Hamdi or other enemy combatants should be given.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld184 and Boumediene v. Bush185 round out the detainee cases. Writing for the majority in Hamdan, Justice Stevens concluded
that special military tribunals186 must either be established by statute or, if
created by presidential order, must follow rules and procedures consistent
with the ,niform Code of Military 9ustice A5,CM9-) and the Geneva Conventions.187 Moreover, the mere assertion of inherent powers did not grant
the Executive the authority to establish military commissions.188 The upshot
of 9ustice .tevens’s opinion amounted to a more systematic reproach to the
administration than the Court had issued two years earlier. Procedures could
not be written for the military commissions unilaterally—Congress had to
approve them—nor could the procedures ignore Geneva Conventions; in
fact, the administration had to comply with the treaty.189 Even though the
Court ultimately invalidated these particular tribunals, it did accept the principle that the Executive has the power to order those individuals he believes
to be unlawful combatants to be tried by military tribunals so long as, the
Court asserted, the tribunals were lawfully constituted.190
!cting pursuant to the Court’s counsel> President Bush asked Congress
for the authorization to create special tribunals operating under basically the
same rules and procedures as those already declared unconstitutional by the
Hamdan Court. Congress acted forthwith and acceded to President Bush’s
re'uest by passing the Military Commissions !ct A5MC!-@>191 which Bush
promptly signed into law in October 2006. Consequently, since the President
sought, and Congress approved, statutory authorization, the Hamdan decision does not appear to posture a demonstrable challenge to presidential
power during a time of war. However, the commissions were ultimately challenged and subsequently found by the Boumediene Court to be an unconstitutional suspension of a prisoner’s right to habeas corpus.
Boumediene involved a direct confrontation to the Bush administration’s authority because it challenged the constitutionality of the MCA. Justice 8ennedy’s ma4ority opinion held that the habeas statute extended to noncitizens at Guantanamo as a guarantee under the Constitution. In addition,
184. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
185. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
186. A Combatant Status Review Tribunal was established for Hamdan’s case by the
U.S. Department of Defense on July 7, 2004. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 570 (majority opinion).
187. Id. at 567.
188. Id. at 593.
189. Id. at 620-25. Justice Stevens, however, did not have a majority for all parts of
the Geneva Conventions analysis. Id. at 564.
190. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95 (2006).
191. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and other sections of Titles 10, 18, 28, and 42).
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the Boumediene Court found that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of the federal courts’ 4urisdiction to hear habeas applications from de<
tainees who had been labeled 5enemy combatants- by the Bush administration.192
The Court’s assertions in the detainee cases in general were a sharp reproach to the administration’s contention that it alone could offer an alternative constitutional understanding of how to conduct the War on Terror.193 In
fact> the Court stated> it is not the 5regime- that has the authority to say 5what
the law is>- but the Court’s authority.194 When the Court is challenged on the
supremacy over constitutional interpretation, the Court will confront the primary commitments of the majority coalition and reestablish its institutional
legitimacy as it did in this set of cases. While the courts have upheld certain
due process rights of individuals classified by the administration as enemy
combatants, what these decisions have not adequately addressed is the core
war-making powers of the executive branch. !s such> the Court’s redefini<
tion of those powers remains largely intact.

VIII.

ZIVOTOFSKY—ESTABLISHING A NEW STANDARD

To date we have witnessed President Barack H. Obama exploiting the
unbridled, unilateral power that so many Presidents195 before him have
claimed—a power the judicial branch has legally sanctioned since 1936.
Broad interpretations by the Obama administration have ushered in new
questions about the great elasticity with which this administration is exercising the commander-in-chief clause. And Zivotofsky196 is the most recent challenge. Initially, it appears the Court handed the presidency a loss when it
renounced the sole organ doctrine. However, upon closer examination the
Court continues to endorse presidential prerogatives with respect to the
recognition and treaty making powers of the Executive.
At issue in the case was whether a federal statute could direct the Secretary of State to record the birthplace of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem as
192. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
193. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
15 (2007) (noting that, at times, various political actors, in this instance the Executive, seek to
supplant other potential constitutional interpreters (the Court in this case) and assert their own
authority to define the powers or 5content of contested constitutional principles-@.
194. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803)).
195. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Covert Operations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 87 (Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon & William D. Rogers eds., 1990) (discussing the ways in which Congress allowed the executive branch to circumvent its policies
regarding covert actions).
196. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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Israel, and if so, would this directive impermissibly infringe on the Executive’s authority to recogniBe foreign states"197
As with so many briefs before, the Justice Department relied on CurtissWright as precedent to claim broad, exclusive, and plenary powers for the
Obama administration in Zivotofsky.198 The case involved the President’s ex<
clusive recognition powers, which the Court essentially upheld. Although the
Court seemed to abandon the sole organ doctrine, it fashioned a new standard. One that still allows future Courts the opportunity to exalt executive
power above Congress in this area.
In a 6-3 majority decision Justice 8ennedy noted while the Court 5de<
clines to acknowledge that unbounded power- that the Curtiss-Wright case
asserts> 8ennedy left 5the sole power to negotiate treaties-199 still in the hands
of the Executive, which draws on Curtiss-Wright’s holding that 5the Senate
cannot intrude$ and Congress is powerless to invade.-200 Moreover, the Zivotofsky Court asserted, 5the Executive ha[s] authority to speak as the sole organ of th[e] government-201 which is the dicta of Curtiss-Wright that the current Court was purportedly denouncing. Ultimately, the Court found that the
federal statute in question was unconstitutional because it usurped the Executive’s sole authority to recogniBe foreign nations as it relates to passports.
The Court noted that its reasoning was supported by precedent and history.
In the specific instance, because the administration had expressed an impartial position by not recogniBing any nation’s sovereignty over 9erusalem> the
statute was unconstitutional. And, in general terms, the Court found that the
recognition power belongs exclusively with the executive branch.
Interestingly, the Court relied on two cases, both of which present conflicting precedents, and yield from the constitutional orders I argue present
two very different paths for presidential ascendancy. As noted, the Court retreats from the President’s 5perennial favorite- ACurtiss-Wright@ and 5resur<
rects an all-but-forgotten opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall that tightly
circumscribed presidential power, Little v. Barreme A1104@.-202 Barreme directly involved the commander-in-chief clause during an undeclared war and
197. Id. at 2081.
198. Brief for the Respondent, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2014)
at 17-18 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)).
199. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086.
200. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
201. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2088.
202. Michael J. Glennon, Recognizable Power the Supreme Court Deals a Blow to
Executive Authority, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-06-23/recognizable-power. This is interesting in and of itself because
both cases, coming from two different constitutional orders> rely on Marshall’s assertions. :n
the first case, Marshall denounces unilateral executive claims and, in the second, Sutherland
misrepresents Marshall’s assertions that the President is the sole organ of foreign policy.
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the Court held an Act of Congress trumps an executive circumventing it. Citing Barreme, the Zivotofsky Court held the President 5is not free from the
ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are
at issue.-203 The Court added it is not the sole authority of the Executive to
conduct the nation’s foreign policy. These remarks might cause some concern for the imperial president moving forward.
It appears the Court is staying the course it established in the detainee
cases, however. If you recall Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in
Boumediene (2008)—the last of the five cases—that criticized the Bush administration’s use of tribunals. Kennedy reasoned the tribunals gave the political branches the power to 5switch the Constitution on or off- and it would
therefore 5leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this
Court, say ‘what the law is.’-204 The Court ultimately checked the executive
branch, and the current case, Zivotofsky, suggests the judicial branch is keen
to rein in the President’s use of executive prerogatives. Judicial decisions
addressing continued foreign policy disputes rest on precedents that are predictably elastic, Curtiss-Wright being that exception until Zivotofsky. However, the 2015 decision is narrow in scope, which leaves the unilateral powers
door wide open for future Presidents—the Zivotofsky majority relied on such
phrases as 5one voice- and speaking 5for the nation- that echo CurtissWright.
Ultimately, presidential ascendancy remains intact. The holding of Zivotofksy emphasizes the continued task of asking questions about courts as
agents of change: the feedback loop between those factors that influence decision-making and in turn how judicial decision-making influences constitutional and political development.205

IV.

CONCLUSION

At the onset of military exigencies, Congress and the public at large give
Presidents enormous freedom of action in the realm of foreign and security
policy. But how the federal courts define the appropriate balance between
security and liberty, which has the potential effect of constraining the President, is relevant to understanding how U.S. foreign policy and the relationship between Congress, the President, and the courts have evolved. Adjudicating competing concerns over the security of the nation and the liberty of
the individual presents a more significant challenge for the Supreme Court
than simply resolving domestic policy disputes. To understand judicial deci-

203.
204.
205.

Id.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
Fletcher, supra note 1.
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sion-making re'uires a better grasp of the factors affecting each 9ustice’s de<
cision, including their alliance to bedfellows on the Court and political leanings. In short, the Supreme Court tends to support a President’s Hamiltonian
view of his role in foreign policy. This is evident with 9ustice .utherland’s
1936 opinion in Curtiss-Wright—that the President is the 5sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations.-206
While 9ustice 9ackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown all but relegated Curtiss-Wright to a footnote, this has not curbed executives from asserting a unilateral role in foreign policymaking. In fact, 9ustice .utherland’s
opinion is oft-cited by the 4udicial branch to support claims of 5broad dele<
gations of legislative power to the President- and 5the existence of independ<
ent> implied> and inherent powers for the President.-207 Moreover, politicians
from both sides of the aisle and the public at large have generally accepted
this assertion. This trend has exalted presidential power far beyond the constitutional blueprint advocated by the Court prior to 1936 and jettisons us into
a state of unilateral executive dominance. While the decisions rendered by
the Court have not always invoked Curtiss-Wright directly, its spirit remains.
This overview of the past eight decades demonstrates a trend that perpetuates the usurpation of powers by the President and the overarching claim
that the President is granted superior authority in foreign affairs. Given this
trend, extra-constitutional arguments as presented by those supporting a powerful executive have a sturdy foundation.
Curtiss-Wright has been an 5authority- on which those rallying for support of plenary presidential powers independent of congressional delegation
rely. For those intent on championing unilateral presidential action in the area
of foreign affairs, or in challenging congressional attempts to limit the Executive’s discretion in this realm> 9ustice .utherland’s profuse language has
shown to be alluring: 5the President alone has the power to speak or lis<
ten . . . Congress itself is powerless to invade . . . .-208
Critics of Curtiss-Wright have vehemently tried to undermine Sutherland’s opinion> but they have unsuccessfully kept it out of briefs and 4udicial
opinions.209 While it is evident that no post-Youngstown decision by the
Court has visibly rested on the Curtiss-Wright decision as controlling precedent, it is evident that there exists a discernible change in path trajectory,
which was established by Sutherland in 1936. Additionally, the Courts entrenched the sole organ doctrine; this is evident by the significant number of
citations that have risen exponentially. The Court’s dynamic institutional role

206.
207.
208.
209.
(1996).

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
FISHER, supra note 32, at 73.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20.
Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 415
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over developmental time influenced the subsequent development of constitutional law and the political development of the executive branch. The Court
alters the path taken by the Executive with little institutional costs to both the
executive and the judicial branches. Thus, the sole organ doctrine weaves
itself into the very fabric of American foreign policy making.
The Court’s 4udicial tilt toward the executive branch caught the attention of many scholars, including Edward Corwin, who argues that courts often defer to the executive branch because presidential control over foreign
affairs frequently generates changes in the world that the U.S. judiciary feels
powerless to invalidate.210 This paper, however, demonstrates the constitutive role of the judicial branch in redefining and reconfiguring the division of
powers between the Executive vis-à-vis the legislative branch in foreign policymaking and allocating to the President the lion’s share. The imperial president is constitutionally legalized with the institution and continued adherence of a new constitutional order established in 1936.
The Court is an architect in redefining presidential unilateral powers in
international relations. It is the continuous and constitutive relationship between the judicial branch and the executive branch that has elevated the President’s authority far beyond the Court’s early 4udicial rulings. As Keith Whittington noted> 5[t]he creation or recognition of a new power by one president
necessarily empowers his successors . . . .-211 I would contend that as the Supreme Court redefined the President’s power in 1936 to unilaterally conduct
our nation’s foreign affairs and legally sanctioned broad claims of executive
authority, the Court not only empowered President Roosevelt, but also
granted to succeeding Presidents the empowerment to act forthwith. The
Court transforms power, shapes politics, and redirects history.

210. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 16 (4th
ed. 1957).
211. WHITTINGTON, supra note 193, at 17.

